Volume 110
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 110,
2005-2006
1-1-2006

Proposed Model Statute on Group Defamation
Michael J. Polelle

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Polelle, Proposed Model Statute on Group Defamation, 110 DICK. L. REV. 717 (2006).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol110/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Proposed Model Statute on Group
Defamation
Michael J. Polelle*
Freedom of expression is about as free as a free lunch. Both often
bear unintended consequences and obligations. As I write this, at least
ten persons have died in riots sparked by satirical cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammad in Jyllans-Posten, a Danish periodical, which some three
years ago had rejected cartoons satirizing the resurrection of Jesus Christ
because they might provoke a public outcry.1 In retaliation for what
many Muslims consider sacrilegious cartoons, an Iranian periodical has
solicited counter cartoons satirizing the Holocaust in order to give the
West a taste of its own medicine.2 Though of unusual proportions, the
escalating reaction sparked by the Muhammad cartoons confirms that
mass media communication has social consequences.
For this reason, most nations, including those in the Western
tradition, such as Great Britain, countries of the European Union, and
Canada, have various legal mechanisms, including criminal prosecution,
for group defamation based on race or ethnicity. The United States
remains peculiar in that a civil remedy for individual defamation exists,
but neither civil, nor administrative, nor criminal remedies realistically
exist for group defamation based on race or ethnicity. The paradox of
defamation law in the United States is that the bigger the defamatory lie,
the more likely no legal remedy exists. I have detailed the origin and
nature of this American legal lacuna in an article entitled, Racial and
3
Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech Friendly Proposal.
The Appendix to that article, reprinted below, sets out my proposed
model "Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation Act." The Act has the goal
of preserving traditional freedom of expression while at the same time
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.
1. See Pakistan Parliament Slams Cartoons, CNN, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/O2/O3/pakistan.cartoons.ap/index.html.
2. See Iran Invites Cartoons on Holocaust, CNN, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/O2/O7/iran.cartoon.ap/index.html.
3. 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 213 (2003) (reprinted in FIRST AMENDMENT
HANDBOOK (James Swanson, ed., West Pub. Co. 2004-05)).
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providing a legal outlet for a community's determination through its
judicial system that a racial or ethnic group has been defamed. By
eliminating a damage remedy and refusing to adopt a regime of prior
restraints, the Act preserves freedom of expression while providing for
the first time other legal remedies based on a unique blend of declaratory
judgment theory with options for retraction and a right of reply. Instead
of chilling speech with crushing damages or injunctions, the Act
multiplies speech by allowing plaintiffs a counter speech remedy in court
that media megacorporations deny out of court. Because of the
elimination of damages as a remedy the arcane complexities of "actual
malice" and a plaintiff's public figure status spawned by New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan4 and Gertz v.Robert Welch, Inc.5 become unnecessary. At

the very least, I hope the proposed Act will stimulate a rethinking of
mass media power and legal remedies for the defamatory abuse of that
power.
6
RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUP DEFAMATION ACT
PREAMBLE
The purpose of this Act is to provide a remedy for a certain kind of
defamation of unincorporated racial or ethnic groups and the
derivative defamation of natural persons within such defamed groups.
The Act is not intended to replace or modify the civil or criminal law
relating to the direct defamation of specific and identifiable persons,
whether natural or artificial, who claim to have been defamed in their
individual capacity rather than by membership in a racial or ethnic
group. The Act is to be construed in such a way as to avoid wherever
possible any conflict with the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by either the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution or the constitution of this state.
SECTION 1: SCOPE OF COVERAGE
This Act provides an action and remedy for group defamation only
insofar as an identifiable racial or ethnic group is the subject of the
defamation and for no other groups.
Comment: Because the Act is novel, the goal is to concentrate
on race and ethnicity, which have a special importance because
of social tensions created by an increasingly multicultural
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6.

23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 213-20 (2003).
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society. Once the Act takes hold it could be extended to other
groups in need of protectionfrom other forms of defamation,
such as defamation based on gender.
SECTION 2: ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION
(A) Only defamation, as defined under the law of this jurisdiction,
which attributes or imputes criminality to any race or ethnic group by
virtue of or by reason of the race or ethnicity of the group is
actionable under this Act.
Comment: False attribution of criminal conduct is such a
serious form of defamation under traditional law that it has
been considered defamation in itself without the need to allege
or prove special damages. In addition, this subclass of
defamation has a precise meaning because criminal conduct is
defined by the criminal laws of the jurisdiction in which this Act
takes effect and by centuries-oldprecedent refining the meaning
of this subclass. It is arguably undesirable, both for possible
constitutionaland practicalreasons, to extend a cause of action
to language substantially more vague in content, such as
"depravity" or "lack of virtue," as set out, for example, in
Art. I § 20 of the Illinois Constitution (Individual Dignity
Clause). Given that the void-for-vagueness doctrine generally
has been used only in criminal cases or in First Amendment
cases involving prohibition or limitation of speech, however, a
jurisdiction might plausibly extend coverage to other
defamatorystatements besides criminal conduct.
(B) Statements of fact that constitute defamation under Section 2(A)
of this Act are automatically actionable.
(C) Statements of opinion, as defined by the law of this jurisdiction
or federal constitutional law, may only constitute defamation under
Section 2(A) if they are based either expressly or implicitly on false
facts. If they are so based on false facts, defamation may exist under
this Act even though consideration of the opinion in conjunction with
such facts is necessary to construe a defamatory meaning. If they are
expressly or implicitly based on true facts, defamation does not exist
under the Act, whether or not the facts are reasonably sufficient to
support the opinion.
(D) Rhetorical hyperbole or pure invective, whether classified as fact
or opinion, is not actionable.
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(E) Defamation of an individual based on race or ethnicity shall not
be considered group defamation unless the number of individuals
defamed is reasonably sufficient to infer an express or implied
defamation of the entire race or ethnic group or unless the individual
defamation, whether based on a real or fictionalized individual, is
reasonably construed as a symbolic defamation of the entire race or
ethnic group.
Comments: Subsections 2(B), (C), and (D) are based on the
constitutional demarcation between actionable defamatory
opinions and non-actionabledefamatory opinions set out by the
Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990). The distinction should remain because it existed at
common law even apartfrom later First Amendment doctrine.
See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Subsection 2(C) would protect researchers,such as Dr. William
Shockley, iftheir controversial or even loathsome conclusions
or opinions are based on true facts. As long as a third-party
reader or listener can evaluate the reasonableness of the
conclusion or opinion based on the disclosed true facts, the
marketplace of ideas needs no state intervention. Subsection
(E) is designed to protect against disingenuous attempts to
disguise group defamation as individual defamation, such as
the symbolic use of "The Wandering Jew" to represent all
Jews. Yet, most individualdefamation will not amount to group
defamation, such as the accusation that a particular ItalianAmerican is a "Mafia hitman. "
SECTION 3: PROPER PLAINTIFFS
(A) The Attorney General of this State is authorized to bring an
action under this Act.
(B) The only other party, or parties, authorized to bring an action
under this Act is a proper representative, or representatives, expressly
selected from the aggrieved racial or ethnic group by the Attorney
General in his or her sole discretion and only if the Attorney General
expressly relinquishes his or her primary authority to bring an action.
(C) Any representative or representatives selected by the Attorney
General pursuant to Section 3(B) shall have the same standing to
bring an action under this Act as would the Attorney General.
Comment: This is based in part on a Massachusetts criminal
libel statute, which provides that statutory actions for libel
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based on "race, color or religion" are instituted "only by the
attorney general or by the district attorney for the district in
which the alleged libel was published." M G.L.A. 272 § 98 C.
Since the reforms of 1990, French law permits certain
associationsin existence forfive years and organized to defend
the Resistance and concentration camp inmates to initiate
criminal proceedings involving war crimes, crimes against
humanity, criminal collaboration, and legal proceedings
brought against those who deny the Nazi Holocaust against
Jews. UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR 47 (Louis Greenspan &
Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). This Act attempts to combine both
approaches by allowing the Attorney General to control the
action so as to prevent frivolous or borderline claims but also
to allow representativesof the affected racial or ethnic group,
who would be the most motivated, to bring the action. Political
realities might also lead an Attorney General to turn the action
over to designated racialor ethnic representatives.
SECTION 4: SOLE REMEDY

(A) The sole and appropriate remedy under this Act shall be an action
for declaratory judgment, whether or not such a remedy would be
appropriate under any other law of this state, and no other relief,
including monetary damages, temporary restraining orders, or
injunctions either permanent or temporary, shall be awarded.
(B) Either party shall have the right to a jury, and if such right is
invoked, the judge shall enter a declaratory judgment in accordance
with the jury verdict.
(C) This Act does not abolish or restrict any remedies that might
otherwise exist under the common law or statutory law of this state.
Comment: The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623, the Libel
Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program, H.R.
2846, 99th Congress (1985), and other reforms in the 1980s
offered a declaratory approach as an alternative to money
damages in a civil defamation action, even though they were not
concerned with group defamation. As for Subsection 4(B), the
predominant view is that declaratory actions historically
preceded equitable actions and are largely governed by statutes
in modern times.
I Walter H. Anderson, Actions for
Declaratory Judgments, § 1, at 1 ("older than the equitable
system of jurisprudence"). Thus, no tradition would suggest
that a jury not be available. Indeed, the community sense of
what constitutes a discreditingstatement to reputation, whether
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individual or group, is particularlysuitablefor jury resolution.
Defamation is one of a few tort actions where England still
normally permitsjuries. 37 Halsbury's Laws of England para.
1075 (4th ed. Reissue, Butterworth Lexis Nexis 2001) (juries
permitted to hear claims of fraud, defamation, malicious
prosecution, andfalse imprisonment). In case of a bench trial,
the judge would, of course, need to find defamation before
issuing a declaratoryjudgment.
SECTION 5: TRUTH
Substantial truth shall constitute a complete defense to any alleged
defamation under this Act, but the burden of proving the truth of the
alleged defamation shall be borne by the defendant.
Comment: Public officials and public figures who sue for
defamation must allege and prove the falsity of the statement.
Even privateplaintiffs who are a subject ofpublic concern must
prove falsity. Philadephia Newspapers v. Hepps, 476 U.S. 767
(1986). Whether or how the Supreme Court would classify a
racialor ethnic group within these categories ofplaintiffs is not
completely clear. But this constitutional mandate requiring
such plaintiffs to prove falsity rather than a defendant to prove
truth as an affirmative defense arose only in the context of a
defamation actionfor money damages with a potential chilling
of FirstAmendment rights. Section 5 represents the traditional
common law unaffected by FirstAmendment considerations.
SECTION 6: STATE OF MIND
The defendant's state of mind at the time of uttering any defamation
under this Act, whether it be with knowledge or reckless disregard of
a defamatory statement's falsity or negligence in failing to use
reasonable care before uttering any defamation or any other state of
mind, is irrelevant under this Act and shall constitute neither an
element of a claim nor of a defense.
Comment: New York Times "actual malice" has spawned
extensive litigation. Since this constitutionalrule has only been
applied to defamation lawsuits seeking damages, the
disadvantagesof the rule can be avoided. For example, editors
will no longer be forced to reveal their internal thought process
in depositions seeking to establish "actual malice " and to that
extent will enjoy greaterfreedom of thought and expression.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 US. 153 (1979) (money damages).
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SECTION 7: CLASSIFICATION OF DEFAMATION
The common law categories of defamation per se or defamation per
quod are abolished insofar as this Act is concerned, and only the
general meaning of defamation under the common law is to be used.
Comment:
The sometimes bizarre and historically hoary
distinctions between defamation per se and defamation per
quod, which have generated much criticism, would be bypassed.
Like the bypassing of New York Times "actual malice, " this
will expedite the trial of a defamation action under this model
statute. The distinctions should still be kept in the typical
defamation action involving individuals.
SECTION 8: PRIVILEGES
Any privileges, be they absolute or conditional, that exist under the
common or statutory law of this state remain as defenses under this
Act, except that any defense based on the common law of fair
comment is subject to Section 2(C) of this Act.
Comment: Because money damages are not involved under this
Act, it might be argued that the privileges should not apply.
However, the privileges typically representsocial interests that
are considered to offset what otherwise would be a defamatory
statement. It would seem that these social interests should still
be paramount, even where only a declaratory judgment is
requested. The privilege of fair comment has been virtually
swallowed up by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and
their numerous offspring. But given that New York Times and
Gertz do not apply under this Act, the qualified privilege offair
comment may spring back into use. Its use, however, is
modified in Section 2(C) as required by Lorain Journal Co. v.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 (1990) in its constitutional parsing of
actionable and non-actionableopinions.
SECTION 9: DEMAND FOR RETRACTION, CORRECTION, OR
RIGHT OF REPLY
(A) No action for defamation shall be commenced against any
defendant unless the complaint alleges that a timely demand for a full
and fair retraction or a timely demand for a correction or a timely
demand for a full and fair opportunity to reply on behalf of the
affected racial or ethnic group was reasonably made and either
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refused or ignored.
(B) If a defendant agrees to provide an opportunity to reply to the
alleged defamation, as provided in Section 9(A), this agreement shall
include the right of access to and use of the defendant's facilities that
were originally used to communicate the alleged defamation to the
end that the reply may as far as possible reach the same audience that
heard the alleged defamation, unless the Attorney General or the
representatives designated by the Attorney General waive this right
of access and use.
(C) It is an absolute defense that a defendant has reasonably offered a
full and fair opportunity to reply under Section 9(A) when an
opportunity to reply has been demanded or has reasonably offered or
made the demanded correction or a mutually agreed correction when
a correction has been demanded.
(D) It is an absolute defense that a defendant has offered or made a
full and fair retraction, whether the Plaintiff has demanded either a
retraction, a correction, or an opportunity to reply.
Comment: This section is based on the Uniform Correction Or
ClarificationOf Defamation Act and the North Dakota version
of that Act. N.D. Cent.Code § 32-43-05 (1995). By
counteracting any harm by the devices of retraction or
correction, litigation can be reduced. The right of reply and
use of a media defendant's facilities avoids the constitutional
limitations of Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) because the right to reply would remain the choice of the
media defendant. This avoids the prohibitedforced intrusion
into editorial judgment and editorial control over media
publications. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974).
SECTION 10: LEGAL ENTITIES
(1) Corporations, partnerships, and all legal entities other than natural
persons, whether for profit or not-for-profit, shall not be deemed a
racial or ethnic group, even though the protection of such groups may
be within their corporate purpose.
(2) Such corporations, partnerships, and all other artificial persons at
law retain whatever rights they have under the common or statutory
law of this state to sue for defamation of the corporate person, and
they may be designated as a representative of an affected racial or
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ethnic group at the sole discretion of the Attorney General.
Comment: This avoids the claim that the Act will protect a
single legal entity organizedfor racial or ethnic purposes on
the ground that, though legally it is one artificialperson, it
actually represents a racialor ethnic group, such as Operation
Push or the Polish National Alliance. The Act should protect
living individuals from the indignity and insult of racial or
ethnic defamation, whether or not they are organized into a
legal entity.
SECTION 11: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Any cause of action brought under this Act shall be brought within
one year after the cause of action accrues.
Comment: A one-year limitation is common for defamation
actions. The short period is further protection against less
meritorious claims or evidence impairedby the passage of time.
A "discovery rule, " which would extend the timeforfiling to a
period within one year after knowledge of the defamation or
after knowledge should reasonably have been acquired, has
been omitted. It is most unlikely that a racial or ethnic
defamation of any significance would escape the attention of the
Attorney General,given the numerous interested members of a
racial or ethnic group who would immediately report the
defamation to the Attorney General. In any case, the discovery
rule generally has been confined to medical malpracticecases.

